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The New Judgment Lien on Lands
ELLSWORTH WILTSHIRE

The lien of a judgment for money upon real estate of the
judgment debtor embodied in Sections 8-386 and 8-390 of the
Virginia Code has been radically changed by the Acts of 1960,
c. 466 and c. 255 respectively. How these amendments affect
the liens of judgments obtained before as well as those obtained after the effective date of the 'amendments (June 27,
1960) will be considered below.
A.

The 1960 Changes.

Prior to the amendment of 1960, Section 8-386 provided that
every judgment rendered in Virginia by any state or federal
court, other than by confession in vacation, became a lien on
all real estate wherever situated in Virginia of or to which the
judgment defendant is or becomes possessed or entitled -at
or after the date of the judgment or, if it was rendered in
court, at or after the commencement of the term at which it
was so rendered, if the case was at least matured and ready
for hearing on the first day of that term. Judgments by confession in vacation became liens from the time of day at
which they were respectively confessed, subject, however, to
different priority as among themselves should the defendant
so direct.
As amended by Acts 1960, c. 466, Section 8-386 now provides as follows:
Every judgment for money rendered in this State by
any state or federal court or by confession of judgment,
as provided by law, shall be a lien on all the real estate
of or to which the defendant in the judgment is or becomes possessed or entitled, from the time such judgment
is recorded on the judgment lien docket of the clerk's
office of the county or city where such land is situated.
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The 1960 amendment makes two fundamental changes. Now
the lien of a judgment commences when and only when the
judgment is recorded on the judgment lien docket in the
proper clerk's office of the county or city where the land
is located. The date of the entry of the judgment in no way
affects the commencement of the lien. There is no relation
back of the lien to the beginning of any term of court. A
recorded judgment has priority over a judgment rendered
earlier but recorded later.
Prior to the 1960 amendment, the lien of a judgment extended throughout the State. Under the amendment, the
judgment is a lien only on lands of the judgment debtor in
the county or city of recordation. For a judgment to operate
as a lien in each of the counties and cities of the State, it
must now be recorded in each; and of course the lien would
commence as to the lands in each county or city only at the
time of the recordation there.
Priority as among judgments against the same debtor depends upon the order of recordation. The amendment thus
favors the judgment creditor who happens to know where the
land of the judgment debtor is located. Also, it enables a
judgment debtor to prefer a later judgment creditor over an
earlier one by disclosing to the later judgment creditor the
location of the judgment debtor's land of which the earlier
judgment creditor is unaware. It renders almost imperative
the examination of a judgment debtor on interrogatories under
Section 8-435 as early as possible after the judgment is rendered to ascertain in what counties or cities he may own land.
Section 8-390 as amended by Acts 1960, c. 255, is as follows:
No judgment or decree rendered in a court of this
State or in the circuit court of appeals or a district court
of the United States within this State shall be a lien on
real estate as against a purchaser thereof for valuable
consideration without notice until and except from the
time that it is duly docketed in the proper clerk's office
of the county or city wherein such real estate may be.
Provided, however, when a judgment is revived under
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the provisions of §8-396, that such revived judgment

shall not be a lien as prescribed in this section until and
unless said judgment is again docketed as provided
herein. In such event the lien shall be effective from the
date of the original docketing.
Strangely enough, amended Section 8-386 requires recordation of the judgment to create the lien, while amended Section
8-390 provides for docketing. Does each of these words refer
to acts required of the clerk in Section 8-377? We may be
accustomed to consider recording as the spreading of the
language of an instrument verbatim on some book in the
clerk's office, yet in various sections of the Code the word
"recorded" is used as a synonym for "docketed". Section
17-64 provides that "abstracts of all judgments authorized
or required by law to be docketed or recorded . . . shall be
recorded in... the judgment docket." Indeed, Section 8-378.1
uses "recorded" in one place and "docketed" in another,
but they clearly refer to the same act. A third designation is
used in Section 19.1-142, which requires the clerk to "enter
the abstract of judgment upon his judgment docket". An
inquiry directed to clerks of several courts reveals that each
now enters on the judgment docket the information obtained
from extracts of judgment just as he did prior to the 1960
amendments and hence makes no distinction between the
docketing and the recording of judgments. Therefore, we may
safely assume that the words "recorded" and "docketed" in
the amendments to Sections 8-386 and 8-390 mean the same
thing.
The first sentence of Section 8-390 was not changed by the
1960 amendment. It created the only exception to or limitation upon the legal lien of the judgment as provided in
Section 8-386 as it existed prior to the 1960 amendment. See
the discussion of this in Gordon v. Rixey, 76 Va. 694, 702
(1882). It provides that as against a purchaser for valuable
consideration without notice a judgment or decree does not
become a lien on real estate until and except from the time
it is duly docketed. Under the 1960 amendment to Section
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8-386 the legal lien of the judgment commences only if and
when such judgment is recorded in the proper clerk's office
of the county or city in which the land is located. And under
Section 8-343 the word "judgment" includes a decree or
order requiring the payment of money. Hence, the requirement of docketing a judgment prescribed in the first sentence
of Section 8-390 is now under Section 8-386 the prerequisite
of the existence of a judgment lien in all instances. Accordingly, it appears that no need now exists for the first sentence
of Section 8-390 to protect purchasers for valuable consideration without notice.
The second sentence in Section 8-390 is new. It provides
that, when the life of a judgment is extended (the word
"revived" is used, although it obviously should have been
"extended") under the provisions of Section 8-396, "such
revived judgment shall not be a lien as prescribed in this
section until and unless said judgment is again docketed as
provided herein". As this proviso relates specifically to the
lien mentioned in Section 8-390, it would appear to be applicable only to purchasers for valuable consideration without
notice. Why this proviso was not placed in Section 8-386
rather than in Section 8-390 is not at all clear. As recordation
is now the basis of the judgment lien, it would seem that
recording of the "revived" judgment should either be required to extend the lien for all purposes or be discarded.
Yet the plain wording of the sentence appears to make it
necessary only as to purchasers for valuable consideration
without notice. The new third sentence of Section 8-390 provides that upon the docketing of the "revived" judgment the
lien shall be effective from the date of the original docketing.
Suppose the extension order is obtained in the eighteenth
year of the judgment. Under the above proviso, does the lien
of the original judgment cease as to purchasers for valuable
consideration without notice upon the entry of the extension
order but upon the later docketing of the "revived" judgment spring back into being and then become effective from
the date of the docketing of the original judgment or does
the lien of the original judgment continue until the end of its
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original period (twenty years from the entry of the judgment) and then cease subject to revival and relation back to
the date of original docketing whenever the "revived" judgment is again docketed7 It would seem that -the period of the
lien of the original judgment should not be diminished by
the very act of obtaining an order extending its life.
B. To what judgments do the 1960 amendments apply?
Of course, the 1960 amendments to Section 8-386 and 8-390
apply to all judgments rendered on or after June 27, 1960,
the effective date of the amendments. But, do these amendments apply to judgments obtained theretofore? Each is
silent as to whether it is prospective only or is both prospective and retrospective.
The general rule is that a statute is not retrospective in its
application in the absence of clear legislative intent to make
it so. Besides, even if a statute is in terms made retrospective,
it cannot affect vested rights. A judgment entered two years
before the 1960 amendments became effective constituted a
lien on the lands of the judgment debtor through the State as
against all persons other than purchasers for valuable consideration without notice, even though it was not docketed.
Clearly, this lien was a vested right when the 1960 amendments became operative, and it could not be affected by these
amendments even if they had been specifically made retrospective. t is well settled in Virginia that, when the right of
a judgment creditor under a money judgment becomes vested,
any act of the legislature divesting or adversely affecting this
vested right is unconstitutional and void. This doctrine was
enunciated in Murphy v. Gaskins, 28 Gratt (69 Va.) 207 (1877)
and has been adhered to in later decisions.
However, rights under a judgment for money do not become
vested unless the judgment of the trial court is affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Appeals or unless such events have
transpired since the rendition of the judgment in the trial
court that it is no longer possible for that judgment to be
affected by any action of the Supreme Court of Appeals.
I
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Thus, in Bain v. Boykin, 180 Va. 259, 23 S.D. 2d 127 (1942),
the plaintiffs, who were partners and who had not complied
with the fictitious name statute, were on that ground held by
the lower court not entitled to recover on their claim for
money judgment against the defendant. The plaintiffs obtained a writ of error, and the case was argued and submitted
in the Supreme Court of Appeals. However, before that court
rendered its decision, the legislature amended the fictitious
name statute to allow anyone in the plaintiffs' situation to
recover. The Supreme Court of Appeals gave effect to the
amendment and allowed the plaintiffs to recover on the basis
that the defendant had acquired no vested right in the judgment in his favor so long as the case had not been finally
decided by that court on the writ of error. Hence, with respect
to judgments rendered prior to June 27, 1960, as to which
the defendant could on or after that date still take appropriate steps to have an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals
granted or as to which an appeal had been granted but the
Supreme Court of Appeals had not on that date finally
affirmed the judgment below, it would appear that the 1960
amendments would be effective if they be deemed retrospective.
In view of the principle that a statute is not to be construed
as retrospective in the absence of clear legislative intent to
that effect and in view of the well established doctrine that
a statute, though in terms retrospective, cannot affect vested
rights existing in judgments entered before the effective date
of such statute, it would seem the proper construction of
the 1960 amendments to Sections 8-386 and 8-390 is that they
should not apply to the existing lien of any judgment rendered before they became effective. This should be true, even
though such judgment had not at the effective date of the
amendments been affirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeals
and it was still possible for such judgment to be later affected
by action of that court.
The final question suggested by the 1960 amendment to
Section 8-390 is whether docketing of the "revived" judgment is required as to purchasers for valuable consideration
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without notice when the original judgment was rendered
prior to June 27, 1960. The mode of extending the life of
a judgment is a matter of remedy and procedure; -and a
statutory change in such mode could be made applicable
to all earlier judgments, provided reasonable opportunity
be allowed for compliance with the new mode. Thus, what
is now Section 8-396 was amended in 1948 to eliminate the
extension of the life of a judgment by the issuance of executions thereon. This amendment was in terms retrospective
with certain limitations. In Phipps v. Sutherland,201 Va. 44:8,
111 SE 2d 422 (1959), the amendment was held to prevent
the life of a judgment rendered earlier from being extended by the issuance of an execution after the amendment
became effective. However, as the 1960 amendment is not in
terms made retrospective, it would seem that docketing of
the "revived" judgment is not required even as to purchasers
for valuable consideration without notice when the original
judgment was rendered prior to June 27, 1960.
Thus, under the 1960 -amendments to Sections 8-386 and
8-390 the lien of the judgment commences only when the
judgment is recorded and is in no way affected by the date
the judgment was rendered; the lien affects only land in
the county or city of recordation; statewide coverage of the
lien is eliminated; and as to purchasers for valuable consideration without notice redocketing is required when the
life of the judgment is extended by an extension order. The
old system of judgments liens, which apparently operated
without any considerable difficulties for some one hundred and
ten years, now exists only with respect to liens of judgments
rendered prior to June 27, 1960.

